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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Doha Round discussions have started again in Geneva.  But, the many missed deadlines 
during the last six years are taking their toll.  They have created such a pessimistic mood that 
few people do bother to look at the facts, hence to realize that there is an attractive package 
within reach.  This note describes this package and analyzes it. 
 
In a nutshell, the three major types of trade barriers – tariffs on industrial goods and on 
agricultural products, domestic support in agriculture – would converge to a roughly similar 
level (12-15 percent).  A key mandate of the Hong Kong Ministerial – the “equivalent level of 
ambition” between liberalization in industrial and agricultural products – would be met.  DCs 
exporters would get what they asked for decades.  ACs exporters would get what they asked 
for during the last decade. 
 
If things are fine on average, there are still efforts to be done for the highest tariffs.  People 
believe that we live in a world of moderate tariffs.  But there are still a notable number of 
scandalously high tariffs – up to 400 percent in Europe, 700 percent in Japan, several  
thousands of percent in many developing countries.  Economic analysis shows that cutting 
these hight tariffs is by far the largest source of the welfare gains for the consumers. 
 
As most of the high tariffs protect agricultural products, consumers tend to back off because 
they often support small farmers.  But the term “agriculture” is a misnomer.  The Doha 
negotiators deal with processed food roughly three times more often than with farm products 
per se.  Moreover, the high “agricultural” tariffs in the developed countries are concentrated 
in processed food.  For instance, the EU would cut its average tariff to 6-10 percent for farm 
products, but to 15-17 percent for food products produced by (often large) industrial firms or 
cooperatives.  Cutting less the farm tariffs and more the food tariffs would be economically 
sound, politically feasible and honest. 
 
 1
The Doha Round:  Where Do We Stand? 
 
Patrick A. Messerlin1
September 30, 2007 
 
Discussions on the Doha Round have started again on the basis of two texts tabled (in their 
personal capacity) by the Chairs of the Agriculture Committee and of the NAMA (industrial 
goods) Committee.  If agreed, these texts would open the last phase of the negotiations in 
goods – the detailed design of their schedule of commitments by the WTO Members.  
 
The note aims to provide the information that business people and consumers need to decide 
whether they should intensify their efforts to support the Doha Round or not.  This support is 
critical.  Without it, there is a serious risk that the negotiators would get bogged down in 
inflated trivia, ultimatly loosing control of the situation. 
 
First, the note presents the Chair texts on market access issues as factually as possible.  It 
decomposes them in “liberalization” and “exceptions” formulas because, in the real world, 
any Round needs to balance efforts to open markets (liberalization) and efforts to safeguard 
some powerful vested interests (exceptions, or “flexibilities” in the Doha jargon). 
 
Second, the note presents an economic assessment of the Chair texts.  This is the most 
important part.  First, it is ultimatly what matters most to businesses and consumers, hence 
triggers their decision to be supportive or not.  Second, such an assessment suggests whether 
the “package” on the table balance the interests of the WTO Members, a critical condition for 
the Round success. 
 
The note comes to the conclusion that the two Chair texts offer a good and balanced package 
– hence that the advanced countries (ACs) as well as the developing countries (DCs) would be 
foolish not to grab the opportunity for two reasons.  A successful Doha Round will be the 
robust stabilizing factor so much needed by a world increasingly worried about financial and 
economic crises.  And, it will not be the last Round, but only a step in a series of Rounds 
[Messerlin 2007a].  That said, the Chair texts could be improved at the margin – in two cases, 
these improvements would be very beneficial.  The note presents some options in this regard. 
 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank very much Francis Ng and Ben Shepherd for their very generous help. 
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SECTION 1.  THE NAMA CHAIR TEXT 
 
The NAMA negotiators face two challenges.  First, the ACs tariffs are low on average, but 
often high on the products crucial for DCs, such as textile, clothing or shoes.  Second, the 
bound tariffs of the major DCs (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa) are high 
(on average 35 percent, with peaks up to 150 percent) while their applied tariffs are moderate 
(on average from 8 to 15 percent).2  In other words, these five major DCs could, instantly and 
without compensation, increase their applied tariffs by a factor of two or three – possibly 
triggering a tsunami of tariff rises in the world trade system in case of a financial and 
economic crises. 
 
1.1.  The NAMA Chair text 
 
Table 1 lists the main liberalization and exceptions formulas, leaving aside the non market 
access issues which are beyond the scope of this note. 
 
Table 1. The NAMA Chair text on tariffs, July 2007
Advanced Developing
countries countries
1. Liberalization formulas
Mandatory
Swiss formula coefficients 8-9 19-23
Free access to LDCs exports yes yes, for the willing
Non mandatory
Sectoral liberalization yes yes
Elimination of low duties yes yes
2. Exceptions formulas none For all the DCs:
yes, with 4 implementation variants
For 4 specific groups of DCs [a]:
LDCs, SVEs, RAMs, and
Countries with low binding coverage
Source: The NAMA Chair text.
Note: [a] LDCs=least-developed countries,  SVEs=small and vulnerable economies,
RAMs= recently acceded Members.  
 
The liberalization formulas 
 
The Chair text provides four “liberalization formulas” – two mandatory and two non-
mandatory.  The key mandatory formula proposes two ranges of Swiss coefficients, from 8 to 
9 for the ACs, and from 19 to 23 for the DCs.3  The second mandatory liberalization formula 
                                                 
2  In sharp contrast, China, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Korea, apply their bound tariffs (no m”tariff water”0.  
For detail, see Messerlin [2007b]. 
3 The Swiss formula is T = [rt/(r+t)] where ‘t’ is the initial tariffs, ‘T’ the post-negotiation tariffs, and ‘r’ the 
reduction coefficient (hereafter the “Swiss coefficient”).  The Swiss coefficient is thus the only element to 
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confirms the specific commitment made in the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial by the ACs (and 
by the DCs willing to do so) to open as widely as possible their markets to exports from the 
Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) – the so-called “duty free, quota free” initiative. 
 
The two non-mandatory liberalization formulas open (i) the possibility of a systematic 
elimination of low duties and (ii) the possibility of undertaking sectoral negotiations. 
 
The exceptions formulas
 
The Chair text provides no exception to the Swiss formula to be applied by the ACs.  By 
contrast, it provides five exceptions formulas for the DCs.  The most important formula is 
available to all the DCs, and it consists in four alternative variants: 
1. applying less than formula cuts provided that (i) that the cuts are no less than half the 
Swiss coefficient-based cuts, (ii) that the tariff lines involved do not exceed 10 percent 
of the total number of NAMA tariff lines, (iii) that they do not exceed 10 percent of 
the total value of the country’s NAMA imports, and (iv) that they do not exclude 
entire HS chapters (that is, broad ranges of similar products); 
2. not applying formula cuts provided that (i) the tariff lines involved do not exceed 5 
percent of the total number of NAMA tariff lines, (ii) that they do not exceed 5 percent 
of the total value of the country’s NAMA imports, and (iii) that they do not exclude 
entire HS chapters; 
3. keeping, as an exception, tariff lines unbound under the same conditions than those 
imposed on variant 2; 
4. increasing the agreed base Swiss coefficient by 3 points on all the products (for 
instance, 26 if the agreed base Swiss coefficient is 23). 
 
All the other exceptions formulas are limited to specific groups of WTO Members.  The 
LDCs, the Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), and the countries with low binding 
coverage (less than 35 percent of their NAMA tariff lines) would get a total, or almost total, 
exemption of tariff cuts.  The “recently acceded members” (RAMs) would get the same 
                                                                                                                                                        
negotiate on.  In what follows, the expression “a Swiss19” means a Swiss coefficient of 19.  For illustration sake, 
a tariff of 300 percent (the highest existing NAMA tariff in the five emerging economies examined in detail) 
would be cut down to 17.9 percent (with a Swiss19) and to 21.4 percent (with a Swiss23). 
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treatment if they are very recent RAMs (such as Saudi Arabia or Vietnam) or a two-years 
grace period if they are less recently acceded members (such as China and Taiwan). 
 
1.2.  An economic assessment of the NAMA Chair text 
 
End of July, the Chair text got a cool reception (probably because the Swiss formula makes 
clear the concessions to be made).  From an economic perspective, the text raises two key 
questions.  Do the liberalization formulas deliver a meaningful liberalization for all the 
Members?  To which extent could the exceptions formulas unravel the liberalization 
commitments? 
 
In the case of the ACs, the answer is straightforward.  As there is no exceptions formulas for 
these countries, Table 2 shows that the highest bound post-Doha tariff would be lower than 8 
percent (compared to 25 to 57.5 percent as of today). 4  Much more importantly for the DCs 
from an economic perspective, the high ACs tariffs are concentrated in textile, clothing and 
shoes – hence they have a highly discriminatory impact on the key DCs exports [Laird 2002].  
Table 2 shows that this discriminatory impact would de facto vanish, and that the ACs tariffs 
would become a trade barrier less important than transport costs, non-tariff barriers (from 
antidumping to norms) or marketing costs in the ACs.  DCs exporters and their ACs efficient 
competitors have requested such changes for years.  ACs consumers – in particular, the 
poorest – would be the major beneficiaries. 
 
                                                 
4  Calculations presented in Tables 2 and 3 are based on HS 6-digit tariff schedules.  Negotiators work at a higher 
level of disaggregation, but a HS 6digit level of disaggregation gives reasonably accurate answers.  There are 
conflicting information on some tariff peaks imposed by the advanced economies, depending from the sources 
(Forbes et alii, Trade Policy Review, etc.).  These problems do not modify notably the results presented because 
of the characteristics of the Swiss formula.  For instance, pre-Doha tariffs of 30 and 50 percent would become 
post-Doha tariffs of 6.9 and 7.6 percent, respectively. 
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Table 2. Bound and applied tariffs, selected advanced countries
Number
of tariff applied
lines average maximum average average maximum average maximum
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. All NAMA products
Canada 4427 5.3 25.0 3.3 2.6 6.6 2.5 6.1
EC 4441 4.0 57.5 3.9 2.3 7.8 2.2 7.0
Japan 4327 2.3 28.5 1.6 1.4 6.8 1.3 6.2
USA 4428 3.4 38.6 2.6 1.8 7.3 1.8 6.6
2.  Clothing, textiles and shoes [a]
Canada 824 13.1 21.0 10.9 5.0 6.3 4.7 5.8
EC 826 8.2 17.0 8.2 4.1 5.9 3.9 5.4
Japan 814 7.1 28.5 5.0 3.8 6.8 3.6 6.2
USA 824 9.4 38.6 8.2 4.1 7.3 3.8 6.6
Source: Data at the Harmonized System 6 digit [Forbes et alii 2004].
Note: [a] All tariff lines of HS Chapters 50 to 64.
Swiss 9 Swiss 8bound tariffs
Current tariffs Post-Doha tariffs
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The case of the DCs is more complicated to assess because of the many formulas involved.  
However, it ultimatly boils down to the balance between the main liberalization formula and 
the main exceptions formula, as shown in the three following steps. 
 
Step 1.  The exceptions formulas for the LDCs, SVEs and countries with low binding 
coverage would not have a major impact on world trade for two reasons.  These countries 
represent a tiny part of world trade – all together, less than two percent of the world trade.  
Hence, these exceptions would hardly have an impact on the exporters from the rest of the 
world, be from ACs or DCs.  Sadly, these exceptions would almost exclusively hurt their 
alleged “beneficiaries” by slowing down the gradual opening of their markets.  Turning to the 
RAMS, the exceptions granted to them do not endanger the Doha trade liberalization either 
because the recent RAMs would be busy implementing the commitments included in their 
WTO accession protocols, or because the less recent RAMs would be subject to new 
commitments.5
 
Step 2.  The step focuses on the impact of the liberalization formula, without introducing yet 
the exception formulas.  In this sense, it is irrealistic.  But its aim is to reveal, as simply and 
clearly as possible, an essential virtue of the Doha Round – its capacity to generate welfare 
gains (and increased trade flows) not only through cuts in applied tariffs (as the previous 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, these “not so recent” RAMs have massively reduced their bound tariffs, and aligned their applied 
to their bound tariffs (no “tariff water”).  For instance, China’s average industrial tariff has been reduced from 60 
(1985) to 15 (2001) to 9 percent (2005) – that is, only 3 percentage points above the 2005 EU average level.  In a 
matter of few years (from 2001 to 2006) China has reduced its maximum bound industrial tariffs by almost half, 
bringing them much closer to the EU level in most industrial sectors.  Moreover, China has reduced its highest 
agricultural (farm and food) tariffs by half, bringing them to a much lower level than the EU (despite the fact that 
two-thirds of the Chinese population still heavily rely on agriculture) [Messerlin and Wang 2007]. 
 6
Rounds) but through cuts in bound tariffs reducing drastically the uncertainty surrounding the 
business decisions to export, or not to export. 
 
Realizing this point is essential because the ongoing negotiations on the liberalization formula 
for the DCs are heavily suffering from a language that has bogged down the negotiations 
during the last two years.  Since the 2003 Cancun Ministerial, some ACs negotiators have 
repeatedly requested that DCs should make tariff cuts large enough to create “new 
commercial opportunities” or “new trade flows”.  For most people, these expressions have 
meant that the DCs should cut their bound tariffs to a level lower than their current applied 
tariffs. 
 
It is astonishing that such a narrow and irrealistic interpretation has prevailed unchallenged 
for so long – even among economists.  It ignores the value of “certainty” – a key parameter 
for businesses and the raison d’être of “binding” in WTO law [Messerlin 2007a].  Bound 
tariffs are delivering certainty, certainty reduces transaction costs, and lower costs generate 
“new commercial opportunities” – all those not exploited by fear of sudden changes in the 
importing country’s tariffs. 
 
What follows assesses the twin capacity of the Chair liberalization formula (i) to cut DCs 
applied tariffs for some products and (ii) to deliver increased certainty for the other products 
through the substantial reduction of their bound tariffs (despite unchanged DCs applied 
tariffs). 
 
For illustration sake, Table 3 presents the averages of the tariff changes expected for the five 
largest DCs (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa) when applying the lowest 
(19) and highest (23) Swiss coefficients proposed by the Chair text.6  The results speak for 
themselves. 
1. The average post-Doha bound tariff would be roughly 11-13 percent (column 3), with 
the average applied tariffs being roughly 8-9 percent (column 4). 
2. The two possible sources of increased commercial opportunities are of almost equal 
importance.  Increasing commercial opportunities generated by cuts in applied tariffs 
                                                 
6  China and Taiwan are not included in Table 3 because their applied tariffs are already at their bound level, so 
that all their tariff cuts under the Doha Agreement would be cuts in bound and applied tariffs.  Korea is not 
included either because it is mostly in the same situation. 
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would occur in about 47 percent of the tariff lines (column 7).  Those associated with 
increased certainty (cuts in bound tariffs, but not in applied tariffs) would occur in 
roughly 52 percent of the tariff lines (column 13).7 
3. The average cut in applied tariffs would be 5-6 percent (column 15), with sharp cuts 
(on average 50 percent, see column 15) when the currently applied tariffs are close to 
high bound tariffs.  A Swiss23 would leave some tariff lines with tariffs higher than 15 
percent, but lower than 18 percent.8 
4. The average cut in bound tariffs without changes in applied tariffs would amount to 
roughly 18 percentage points (column 9).  The remaining “tariff water” (the excess of 
the post-Doha bound tariffs over the currently applied tariffs) would be cut to 6-7 
percent (column 10) down from 25 percent, a bearable risk for most traders and 
investors. 
 
Combined altogether, these results are very close to what European and world businesses 
have asked for since the early 2000s [Businesseurop (formerly UNICE) 2007, International 
Chamber of Commerce 2007].  They should also be very attractive for the exporters from all 
over the world since such improved market access would be delivered on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
 
Table 3.  The NAMA Chair text:  the balance between increased certainty and cuts in applied tariffs, simple averages based on five selected 
emerging economies (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa) Provisional
Current Current Post Post
bound applied Doha Doha Current Current Occur- Post Increased Tariff Current Current Occur- Post Cuts in
(MFN) bound applied bound applied rences Doha certainty water bound applied rences Doha applied
(MFN) [c] average [a] [b] (MFN) [c] average tar. [d]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1.  The case of the Swiss 19 coefficient
average tariff 30.6 11.1 11.1 8.2 28.9 4.5 56.2 10.9 -18.0 6.4 33.0 17.5 35.5 11.8 -5.8
maximum tariff 83.0 61.6 15.0 14.7 61.2 13.3 45.0 14.3 -46.9 13.9 79.0 61.6 53.4 14.7 -50.2
"high" tariffs [e] -- 2014 14 12 1748 3 -- 4 -- -- 2375 2010 -- 11 -- 
2.  The case of the Swiss 23 coefficient
average tariff 30.6 11.1 12.4 9.0 29.0 4.8 60.0 12.2 -16.8 7.3 33.2 18.0 31.6 13.3 -4.7
maximum tariff 83.0 61.6 17.4 16.9 61.2 14.7 48.3 16.4 -44.8 15.9 78.2 61.6 51.5 16.9 -48.4
"high" tariffs [e] -- 2014 112 98 1870 6 -- 21 -- -- 2254 2008 -- 91
Source:  WITS data. Author's computations.
Notes: [a] Decreases from current bound tariffs to post-Doha bound tariffs. [b] Gaps between current applied tariffs and post-Doha bound tariffs.
[c] In this column, the top figure provides the import share concerned, and the bottom figure the share of the tariff lines concerned.
[d] Decreases from initial applied tariffs to post-Doha bound tariffs. [e] Number of tariff lines with MFN tariffs higher than 15%.
Increased commercial opportunities
generated by cuts in applied tariffs
All tariffs Increased commercial opportunities
generated by increased certainty
15
-- 
 
 
                                                 
7  The two shares do not sum to 100 percent because of current zero tariffs. 
8  The figure of 91 is the average over the five countries, but almost all these tariff lines are from the Indian and 
South African tariff schedules. 
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Step 3.  Could the exceptions formula unravel these attractive results?  A precise answer to 
this question depends upon the detailed implementation of the exceptions.  What follows 
assumes that the exceptions would be concentrated on the tariff lines with the currently 
highest applied tariffs.  This criterion is not the only one that would be used, but it is the most 
likely.9  Based on this assumption, Table 4 presents the calculations for Brazil (a case of 
current high bound tariffs and substantial applied tariffs) and for Indonesia (a case of current 
high bound tariffs and low applied tariffs).10
 
Table 4 provides three important results.  First, variant 4 (the base Swiss formula on all the 
products plus 3 points) increases modestly the average tariff while minimizing the change in 
tariff dispersion.  In short, it minimizes the damages to the importing country and its trading 
partners from an economic point of view.  Second, variant 1 is more damaging, particularly 
for the DCs’ trading partners since it imposes already substantial tariffs (high enough to have 
the capacity to deter imports in some cases) on the largest number of tariff lines.  Lastly, 
variant 2 seems the most damaging for the DC using it because it generates the highest tariffs, 
hence the largest domestic production distortions.  (It is impossible to provide estimates for 
variant 3 without more information, but it is likely to be close to variants 1 or 2.) 
 
Table 4.  The impact of the exception formulas: the case of Brazil and Indonesia
Post Doha tariffs No ex- Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 4 No ex- Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 4
ception [a] [b] [c][d] ception [a] [b] [c][d]
1.  Brazil
Average tariff 11.6 13.0 13.1 12.6 13.0 14.3 14.4 13.9
Maximum tariff 14.1 23.7 35.0 15.7 16.2 24.4 35.0 17.7
High tariffs [e]
Average tariff -- 23.6 34.8 15.7 16.2 24.4 34.9 17.7
Number tariff lines 0 600 301 5 5 606 306 5
2.  Indonesia
Average tariff 12.0 13.3 13.8 13.1 13.5 14.9 15.2 14.5
Maximum tariff 16.0 27.6 100.0 18.0 18.7 29.5 100.0 20.6
High tariffs [e]
Average tariff 16.0 22.9 40.1 16.0 16.5 24.5 40.1 15.8
Number tariff lines 3 599 299 20 24 599 299 2986
Source:  WITS data. Author's computations.
Notes [a] Half cuts on 10 percent of the tariff lines with the current highest applied tariffs.
[b] No cuts on 5 percent of the tariff lines with the current highest applied tariffs.
[c] The base Swiss coefficient (19 or 23) plus 3 points.
[d] Variant 3 cannot be calculated with the publicly available information.
[e] High tariffs are defined as those higher than 15%.
Liberalization formula: Swiss19 Liberalization formula: Swiss23
 
 
                                                 
9  Under this assumption, it is important to underline that the condition on the share in total value of imports has 
no role to play because applied tariffs are high enough to limit severely the value of the imports in question.  For 
instance, the share of the 10 percent tariff lines with the highest tariffs represents less than 5 percent of Brazil’s 
total imports. 
10  In the Swiss23 case, 99 percent of the Indonesian 2966 tariff lines exhibit a tariff ranging from 15 to 16 
percent. 
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In short, the ideal solution would be to make variant 4 – adding a given number of points to 
the base Swiss coefficient – the only exception formula.  If eliminating the variants 1 to 3 is 
impossible, ranking all the variants (4 being the first) would be a (weak) alternative. 
 
1.3.  Concluding remarks 
 
The NAMA Chair text has attracted two main criticisms.  First, some ACs negotiators argue 
that a too limited liberalization is requested from the DCs.  As shown above, this criticism 
ignores the huge benefits of increased certainty.  Moreover, shifting to a Swiss15 would 
increase the occurrence of increased commercial opportunities via cuts in applied tariffs by 
only a couple of percentage points, whereas the post-Doha bound tariffs would decrease by 
one percentage point. 
 
Second, some DCs negotiators argue that the gap between the ACs and DCs level of 
commitments in NAMA is too small – the difference between the Swiss coefficients for the 
ACs and the DCs should be larger.  This argument ignores the crucial – for the DCs – 
elimination of the ACs discriminatory protection against the key DCs exports, such as textile, 
clothing or shoes, and the negligeable additional liberalization in the ACs if the DCs 
negotiators try to impose a Swiss5 or so.  Lastly, some DCs negotiators argue the level of 
liberalization in agriculture would not match the level in NAMA.  This point is analyzed in 
the following section. 
 
SECTION 2.  THE AGRICULTURE CHAIR TEXT 
 
The term of negotiations in “agriculture” is a misnomer.  The current negotiations deal with 
many more tariff lines for processed food products (from two-thirds to three-quarters of all 
the tariff lines under negotiation) than for farm products (the remaining tariff lines). 
 
Ignoring this crucial point leaves the wrong impression among the public opinion and the 
farmers that all the tariff cuts under discussion concern the farmers, while in fact, most of 
them deal with industrial goods produced by (often large) industrial firms or cooperatives.  In 
fact, most of the currently high tariffs are concentrated in food (not farm) products.11  A key 
                                                 
11  This situation is the heritage of the massive tariff escalation granted to the food processors during the 
Uruguay Round tariffication for compensating them for the high level of protection of farm products. 
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to the success of the Doha Round consists in making the public opinion aware of this feature – 
people support small farmers, not food industries – and in using the political degree of 
manoeuver that such a feature allows. 
 
Trade negotiations in agriculture deal with three aspects:  tariff cuts (market access) 
production subsidies (“domestic support” in negotiators’ parlance) and export subsidies of all 
kinds (“export measures” in negotiators’ jargon) hence the much more complicated structure 
of the Chair text in agriculture, compared to the NAMA Chair text. 
 
2.1.  Tariffs 
 
The following description is limited to the most essential aspects of the liberalization and 
exceptions formulas in the Chair text.  It leaves aside the many provisions (which are often 
“exceptions to exceptions”) the main reason of which is to ensure that the core formulas are 
not too much circumvented. 
 
2.1.1.  The Chair text:  the liberalization formulas 
 
The Chair text puts forward two core tariff liberalization formulas, one for the ACs and one 
for the DCs.  Table 5 presents the proposed range of tariff cut rates for each of the four tiers 
defined.  It is important to note that the proposed “tiered” formulas are “discontinuous”, that 
is, that the current tariffs at the low end of any tier are more deeply cut than the current tariffs 
at the high end of the preceding tier.  For instance, the Chair formula for the ACs would cut a 
current tariff of 51 percent to 19.4 percent, while it would cut a current tariff of 49 percent to 
22.1 percent.  Graph 1 illustrates this bizarre and unsatisfactory feature. 
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Table 5. Tabled proposals on farm tariff cuts, September 2007
definition tariff cut definition tariff cut definition tariff cut definition tariff cut
of the tiers rate (%) of the tiers rate (%) of the tiers rate (%) of the tiers rate (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Tariff cuts to be imposed on advanced countries
highest tier >90% 60 >75% 75 >60% 85-90 >75% 66-73
medium high tier 60-90% 50 50-75% 65 40-60% 75-85 50-75% 62-65
medium low tier 30-60% 45 20-50% 55 20-40% 65-75 20-50% 55-60
lowest tier 0-30% 35 0-20% 45 0-20% 55-65 0-20% 48-52
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developing countries [a]
highest tier >130% 40 >130% 40 >60% [a] >130% 44-49
medium high tier 80-130% 35 80-130% 35 40-60% [a] 80-130% 41-43
medium low tier 30-80% 30 30-80% 30 20-40% [a] 30-80% 37-40
lowest tier 0-30% 25 <30% 25 0-20% [a] <30% 32-35
Thresholds for defining a cap on the highest tariffs
advanced countries -- 100 -- 100 -- 75 -- -- 
developing countries -- 150 -- 150 -- 100 -- -- 
Source: The Chair, EC, G20 and U.S. proposals.
Note: [a]  The Chair text (columns 7 and 8) defines the coefficients for DCs as two-thirds of the coefficients for the advanced countries.
EC proposal U.S. proposalG20 proposal Chair proposal
 
 
The Chair text proposes four more liberalization formulas: 
1. the end of the special agricultural safeguard (an Uruguay exception granted to the 
ACs) although it could partly survive under the sensitive products provision (see 
below); 
2. the commitment made at the Hong Kong Ministerial by the ACs (and by the willing 
DCs) to eliminate all barriers (tariffs and quotas) imposed on imports of agricultural 
products from LDCs. 
3. a similar commitment for another group of DCs – the cotton exporters. 
4. possible additional market access for commodity-dependent countries and for tropical 
and associated products. 
 
2.1.2.  The Chair text:  the exceptions formulas 
 
The Chair text in agriculture is much richer in exceptions formulas than the NAMA text.  
First, in sharp contrast with NAMA, the ACs can designate some products as “sensitive”.  The 
tariff cuts on imports of such products would be smaller than those required by the tiered 
liberalization formula.  For compensating this more limited tariff liberalization, tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQs) would be put in place for these products.  The quota component of the TRQs 
should amount to no less than 4 to 6 percent of the domestic consumption expressed in 
physical units.  Moreover, the use of this exceptions formula would be limited to 4 to 6 
percent of the dutiable tariff lines in agriculture (possibly extended to 8 percent, subject to 
some conditions).  A 6 percent coverage would roughly correspond to a hundred of tariff lines 
at the HS 8-digit level of disaggregation (the level used for the calculations presented below). 
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Second, exceptions formulas close to those granted in NAMA would be available to the three 
above-mentioned specific groups of DCs (LDCs, SVEs and RAMs).  In addition, all the DCs 
would have access to four exceptions formulas: 
1. the right to designate sensitive products on more generous terms than for the ACs (for 
up to one third of the tariff lines); 
2. the right to protect products designated as “special” (pending negotiations specifying 
the definition of “special” and the conditions for using this provision); 
3. the access to a “special safeguard mechanism” (pending negotiations designing such a 
mechanism);  and, 
4. the possibility of compensations in case of “preference erosion” (that is, when DCs are 
loosing their preferential access to ACs markets). 
 
2.1.3.  An economic assessment of the Chair text 
 
The calculations presented below are exclusively based on the tiered liberalization formula 
and on the sensitive-products exceptions formula because they are the two crucial formulas 
for the ACs and for the critical group of DCs (the emerging economies).  They focus on the 
EC which is the pivotal player in this domain.  The case of the DCs is examined much more 
briefly due to the lack of adequate publicly available information. 
 
Table 6 illustrates the Chair liberalization formula in the EC case.  Rows A show the “average 
tariff” and the “average tariff cut” which are the most frequently used indicators by the 
negotiators.  However, these indicators are not very meaningful from an economic point of 
view because the current tariffs on agricultural products vary hugely.  For instance, the 
highest bound tariffs in agriculture range from 407 percent in the EC to 1705 percent in 
Japan.12
 
Table 6 provides the two important informations from an economic perspective.  First, Rows 
C focus on the 100 highest tariffs since, as economic analysis shows, cutting high tariffs 
delivers the largest welfare gains.  In this respect, it is worth noting that, in the EC case, 87 
out of the 100 highest tariffs are imposed on processed food products, and 10 on semi-
processed food products. 
                                                 
12  For information sake, the highest bound tariffs amount to much higher level in DCs, such as 3000 percent 
(Egypt) or more than 140000 percent (Malaysia). 
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 Second, Rows B of Table 6 make a distinction between the farm and food products in order to 
assess the different impact of the current negotiations on these two groups of goods (and 
related producers).  As said above, this feature is essential for finding innovative 
compromises.  It makes the “rebalancing” of the proposed tariff reductions – cutting more the 
high tariffs, and less the low tariffs – an alternative attractive for economic and policitical 
reasons [Messerlin 2007b].  Cutting deeper the high tariffs would deliver more economic 
welfare gains to the European consumers than the current proposals.  Cutting less the low 
tariffs would deliver political benefits, since a vast majority of EC farm producers (all those 
protected by small and moderate tariffs) would find the rebalancing of the EC tariff proposal 
favourable for their interests, compared to the current proposals. 
 
That said, column 1 provides the EC current tariffs (including the ad valorem equivalents of 
the many EC specific tariffs).  Columns 2 to 4 gives the post-Doha EC tariffs based on the 
proposals tabled by the three major negotiators – the EC, the US, and the G20 (the G20 
proposal has become the median proposal thanks to the US tactic of tabling very large tariff 
cuts). 
 
Columns 5 and 6 provides the post-Doha EC tariffs based on the Chair liberalization formula.  
They show that, before exceptions, the tariff cuts suggested by the Chair are close to those 
generated by the G20 proposal.13
 
                                                 
13  The EC, US and G20 proposals do not specify the exceptions formula. 
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Table 6.  The Chair text on tariff cuts in farm and food products:  the EC case
Cur ren t
t ar if f s EC G20 US Variant B [f]
low  [c] h igh  [c] low  [c] h igh  [c] low  [c] h igh  [c] low [c]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
A.  All t ar if f s
average t ar if f 24,2 12,3 9,2 5,8 10,0 8,7 12,2 11,2 11,6 10,4 11,2
average t ar if f  cut  rat e [ -- 49,4 62,0 76,1 58,8 64,0 49,5 53,7 52,1 57,0 53,9
B.  Average t ar if f s by t ype of  product s
f arm  com m od it ies 19,7 10,2 7,9 5,0 8,3 7,3 8,5 7,6 8,6 7,8 8,8
f arm  ho r t icult ure 13,6 7,7 6,3 4,3 6,3 5,6 6,6 5,9 6,7 6,1 6,6
sem i-p rocessed  f ood 12,6 6,4 4,8 3,1 5,2 4,6 6,0 5,4 5,9 5,3 5,8
p rocessed  f ood 32,6 16,2 12,0 7,5 13,2 11,5 16,8 15,5 15,7 14,1 14,9
C.  The 100 tariff lines with the current highest tariffs
average t ar if f 137,4 55,0 34,4 17,2 46,7 37,1 92,1 87,3 87,7 76,8 62,8
m in im um  t ar if f 89,8 35,9 22,4 11,2 30,5 24,2 60,1 57,0 72,8 65,0 51,4
m axim um  t ar if f 264,3 105,7 66,1 33,0 89,9 71,4 177,1 167,8 124,9 106,4 82,5
Source: EC agriculture tariff schedule (including ad valorem equivalents, except the 407.8 percent tariff).  Author's computations.
Notes:  [a] Before exceptions (not specified enough in the proposals).
[b] Limited to the exceptions formula related to sensitive products.
[c] Calculations based on the low and high cut rates of the range proposed by the Chair text.
[d] Assuming a deviation of half in the tariff cuts (see text).
[e] The variant is a continuous form of the tiered formula, with an add up factor of 35 percentage points on 4 percent of the tariff lines (see text).
[f] The variant is a continuous form of the tiered formula, with an exception based on a Swiss120 on the 6 percent of the tariff lines (see text).
[g] The ratio of the post-Doha tariffs to the current tariffs (including the ad valorem equivalents of the specific tariffs).
Variant A [e]
Post-Doha tariffs
based on variants
of the Chair formula
Post-Doha tariffs
b y t he Chair  t ext
bef o re
exceptions [b]
af t er
exceptions [b][d]
b ef o re excep t ions [a]
Post-Doha tariffs generated
put forward by
 
 
Of course, what matters are the tariff cuts after the implementation of the exceptions formula 
based on sensitive products.  Three assumptions have been used for calculating the impact of 
such a formula. 
1. the EC applies the exceptions formula only to the tariff lines with the highest tariffs.  
This is a plausible criterion, but one should expect other criteria to play some role for 
two reasons.  First, the discontinuity of the tiered formula would make difficult for 
governments to explain to their producers at a lower end of a tier that they would end 
up with post-Doha tariffs notably lower than those situated at the higher end of the 
preceding tier.  Using the exceptions formula for the tariffs at the lower end of each 
tier would reduce the hard fights to be expected  between the domestic interests 
involved.  Second, a substantial number of products which do not exhibit the highest 
tariffs are already subject to tariff-rate quotas.  The domestic producers concerned are 
likely to fight hard for keeping their tariff-rate quotas by getting access to the 
“sensitive product” status. 
2. the EC designates a large coverage of products (6 percent of the tariff lines, that is, 
roughly 100 products).  This is a likely assumption because of the above-described 
strong pressures for designating sensitive products. 
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3. the EC deviates by one half (the Chair text allows deviations by one third to two 
third).  This assumption of moderation is far to be guaranteed, but it is adopted in 
order to present a “middle-of-the-road” picture. 
 
Under these assumptions, columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 show that the post-Doha EC average 
tariff based on the Chair proposal after exceptions ranges from 12 to 13 percent, that is, is 
close to the post-Doha average tariff before exceptions suggested by the EC proposal. 
 
Columns 7 and 8 deserve two final remarks.  First, the exceptions formula tends to favor 
strongly the processed food sector.  Tariffs on processed food would increase, on average, by 
three points, while the tariffs on farm and semi-processed food products would increase by 
half a point or less.  Second, the Chair exceptions formula raises a serious problem to the 
extent that a substantial number of post-Doha tariffs would be higher than 100 percent, a 
threshold for which the EC, G20 and US proposals have envisaged the introduction of a cap.  
Once again, the concentration of the high tariffs in the food products is an opportunity of 
innovative compromises that negotiators should not waste all the more because many of these 
food products are waste products (dog and cat food, whey, etc) goods with very little potential 
in international trade (yoghurts) or with questionable importance (cucumbers, gherkins, etc) 
[Messerlin 2007b]. 
 
Turning to the DCs, the lack of publicly available data at the required level of disaggregation 
(and including the ad valorem equivalents used by the trade negotiators) prevents to present 
similar detailed calculations.  However, the following simple exercise sheds an interesting 
light on what would happen for these countries.  It assumes that the DCs have the same tariff 
structure than the EC.  This is likely to be a conservative assumption because DCs tend to 
have much higher bound average tariffs in agriculture than the EC (from 1,5 to 30 times).  In 
other words, such an exercise gives a sense of the minimal difference between tariff cuts 
required from ACs and DCs. 
 
Under this assumption, the DC average post-Doha tariff would be above 15 percent before 
exceptions, the highest tariffs being close to 150 percent.  In short, liberalization in DCs 
agriculture would mostly consist in reducing “tariff water” (the difference between bound and 
applied tariffs).  Of course, it would also be important to make the distinction between farm 
and food products.  It would be surprizing thet the DCs (or, at least, the emerging economies) 
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would not have also a strong tariff escalation, with their highest tariffs concentrated in the 
food products. 
 
2.1.4.  Alternative options for the exceptions formula 
 
The above analysis shows that the Chair text would lead to a substantial – on average – tariff 
liberalization of the ACs agriculture.  For instance, the EU would cut its average tariff on 
agricultural imports to roughly 12 percent.  This outcome is very important.  It means that the 
average ACs post-Doha tariffs in agriculture are close to the average DCs post-Doha tariffs in 
NAMA.  In short, the key objective of a “comparably high level of ambition” in NAMA and 
agriculture that has been decided at the Hong Kong Ministerial would be roughly achieved in 
its tariff dimension (see below for its subsidy dimension). 
 
However, this positive conclusion requires a caveat – it is based on average post-Doha tariffs.  
It does not take into account the dispersion of tariffs, in other words, the importance of the 
high tariffs.  For the same average post-Doha tariff of 12 percent, maximum tariffs would 
mostly be within the range of 30 percent in NAMA (except if one uses the variant 2 of the 
NAMA exceptions formula) and within the range of 90-100 percent in agriculture, with a 
notable share of them being much above 100 percent. 
 
The negotiators have two options for solving this problem.  First, they could agree on the 
lowest commun denominator, that is, a Swiss23 coupled with the variant 2 in NAMA and the 
Chair proposal in agriculture with the current exceptions.  Such an option would have a 
minimal liberalization content.  It would thus trigger the frustations of the businesses without 
calming the anti-globalizers – a combination that will make the return to their capitals 
difficult for the negotiators. 
 
Alternatively, they could improve the exceptions formula in agriculture.  This alternative may 
be easier to reach that it seems at a first glance if the negotiators use the opportunity offered 
by focusing on the high (but politically easier to fight) tariffs on food products.  What follows 
looks at various alternatives to improve the situation. 
 
Before looking at these alternatives, it is useful to note an apparent paradox.  Improving the 
exceptions formula would be made easier if the tiered liberalization formula itself is 
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improved.  This condition could be achieved at almost no cost for the existing negotiating 
balance – simply by making the liberalization formula “continuous”, that is, by imposing that 
the starting point of a tier should be the same than the end point of the previous tier.  A 
continuous tiered liberalization formula would eliminate the many pressures to have recourse 
to exceptions when shifting from one tier to another one (a particularly important point for the 
current tariffs around the 75 to 85 percent in the EC case).  
 
Graph 1.  Improving the exceptions formula: the EC case
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That said, improving the existing exceptions formula on sensitive products could be done in 
two, alternative or combined, ways.  First, the maximum coverage of the exceptions formula, 
that is, the percentage of tariff lines eligible for exceptions, could be reduced (a move made 
easier if the tiered formula is continuous).  Second, the exception for sensitive products could 
 18
be expressed in terms similar to those used for the variant 4 in NAMA – adding a fixed 
amount of percentage points to the base tariff cuts.14
 
For illustration sake, Graph 1 and Columns 9 and 10 of Table 6 provide the post-Doha tariffs 
delivered by a continuous tiered formula (based on the same tiers and tariff cut rates than 
those put forward by the Chair text) with a coverage of sensitive products limited to 4 percent 
of the tariff lines, combined with the addition of 35 percentage points to the post-Doha tariffs 
before exception.  The average tariff does not change much (by half a percentage point) but 
the need for a cap on tariffs has almost vanished. 
 
There is a last alternative.  A continuous tiered formula is close to a Swiss formula except for 
the highest tariffs.  Not using a Swiss formula in agriculture was a mistake made three years 
ago.  It would have had the immense benefit to “rebalance” more smoothly and strongly than 
a tiered formula the “burden” of tariff cuts from farm to food products – that is, from 
politically and economically sensitive sectors to economically more resilient and politically 
less powerful sectors [Messerlin 2007b].  But negotiators have repeatedly indicated that they 
do not want to consider a systematic use of the Swiss formula at this very late stage of the 
negotiations. 
 
That said, the negotiators could use the Swiss approach only for the exceptions formula.  
Graph 1 and Column 11 of Table 6 illustrate a case associating a continuous tiered formula 
for liberalization combined with a Swiss formula for the exceptions.  More precisely, a Swiss 
coefficient of 120 is used for cutting the tariffs of the 6 percent of the products having the 
highest tariffs.  This option associates a relatively stable average tariff with no post-Doha 
tariffs higher than 100 percent for the products under exceptions – in other words, the 
exceptions formula does not distort too much the domestic production structure, a very 
positive feature for countries willing to diversify their agriculture production. 
 
2.2.  Domestic support and export measures 
 
Export measures do not require a long description and assessment.  The Chair text spells out 
in detail the disciplines necessary for implementing the ban of these measures that was agreed 
                                                 
14  Another alternative would be to define a tariff cap.  But such a variant is a less attractive option, from an 
economic as well as negotiating perspective. 
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at the Hong Kong Ministerial.  From the negotiating perspective, this part of the negotiations 
in agriculture should not raise serious problems for many reasons, one of the most compelling 
being the decision of the EC (by far the main provider of export subsidies) to eliminate 
unilaterally such subsidies.  From an economic perspective, banning export measures is 
positive under a key condition – that the other instruments of protection (tariffs and domestic 
support) are reduced enough for boosting the production of efficient producers, in order to 
counterweight the inevitable decline in subsidized production. 
 
Quite different is the situation of domestic support where some DCs negotiators are strongly 
arguing that more substantial concessions should be requested from the ACs.  What follows 
focuses on the ACs because domestic support in DCs is much smaller, though often on the 
rise [OECD 2007]. 
 
2.2.1.  The Chair text on domestic support 
 
The full machinery for cutting progressively domestic support put in place since the Uruguay 
Round is becoming increasingly complex.  For brevity sake, what follows focuses on the two 
major elements of domestic support – the so-called “overall trade distorting support” (OTDS) 
and its main component, the “final bound total aggregate measure of support” (FAMS).  Both 
deal with the most distortive subsidies (those with a notable impact on production and prices). 
 
Table 7 presents the tiered cuts proposed by the Chair text.  Rows A to C of Columns 1 and 2 
show the various elements of current situation:  the amounts (in US dollars) of the bound 
commitments at the end of the implementation period of the Uruguay Round Agreement 
(2004) the effective amounts of the distortive domestic support spent in 2004, and the 
estimated amounts of expenses until 2010 (with the caveat that these amounts are highly 
dependent from the world prices, especially in the US case).  Then, Rows D show the cuts 
proposed by the EC, the US and the G20.  Finally, Rows E present the cuts proposed by the 
Chair.  These cuts tend to be close to the G20 proposal in the OTSD case, and similar to the 
EC proposal in the FAMS case. 
 
In addition, the Chair text puts forward additional liberalization formulas, notably (i) caps for 
product-specific AMS, (ii) cuts in de minimis domestic support, (iii) caps for the Blue Box 
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support, and (iv) reductions in support for cotton production.  There is no exception available 
to the ACs. 
 
Table 7.  Domestic support in the EC and the U.S. (billion U.S.$)
U.S. EC25 U.S. EC25
1 2 3 4
1.  Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS)
A. The Uruguay final bound commitments 55,0 149,0 47,4 70,6
B. Effective amounts in 2004 23,0 74,0 19,8 35,1
C. Estimated amounts in 2006-2010 18.0 [b] 40,0 15,5 19,0
D. The WTO Members' proposals
EC 22,0 44,7 19,0 21,2
US 25,9 37,3 22,3 17,7
G20 13,8 29,8 11,9 14,1
E. The Chair text
low coefficient 18,7 37,3 16,1 17,7
high coefficient 14,9 22,4 12,8 10,6
2.  The Final Bound total AMS (FAMS)
A. The Uruguay final bound commitments 19,1 89,0 16,5 42,2
B. Effective amounts in 2004 13,0 42,0 11,2 19,9
C. Estimated amounts in 2006-2010 [c] 26,0 -- 12,3
D. The WTO Members' proposals
EC 7,6 26,7 6,6 12,7
US 7,6 15,1 6,6 7,2
G20 5,7 17,8 4,9 8,4
E. The Chair text 7,6 26,7 6,6 12,7
Sources:  EC, US, G20 and Chair proposals. Penn [2005] Jales and Nassar [2006] Kutas [2006].
Notes:
[a] Agriculture value added, in current dollars [Source: World Development Indicators]
[b] Estimate based on the USDA Farm Bill 2007 Proposal.
[c] Difficult to forecast (depend on world prices evolution).
(billion US dollars)
Commitments and
effective support
in % ag. prod. [a]
Commitments and
effective support
 
 
2.2.2.  An economic assessment of the Chair text on domestic support 
 
A key problem of the proposals on domestic support is that they are expressed in value terms 
(billions of US dollars or euros).  That makes hard to compare the domestic support cuts with 
the rest of the Doha package which is expressed in tariff cuts.  This absence of comparison 
opens the doors to endless discussions about the fairness of the cuts in domestic support 
compared to tariff cuts, be in NAMA or in agriculture. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 “translate” the domestic support cuts expressed in monetary 
amounts in terms equivalent to tariff cuts.15  Rows A to C of Columns 3 and 4 present the 
OTDS and FAMS amounts, respectively, as percentages of the value of agricultural 
                                                 
15  Technically, tariffs and production subsidies have the same effect – raising the domestic prices received by 
producers.  In case of tariffs, the domestic price is the world price boosted by the tariff.  In case of subsidies, the 
domestic price is the world price plus the subsidy paid by the government. 
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production (value added) which are percentages similar to tariff rates.16  In 2004, the Uruguay 
OTSD commitments represented 50 to 71 percent of the US and EC (respectively) agricultural 
value added.  But, the same year, the effective amount spent represented only 20 to 35 
percent, whereas the currently expected spending for the years 2006-2010 would represent 16 
to 19 percent (assuming a constant value added in agriculture).  There is thus a huge AC 
“subsidy water” (the difference between bound subsidies and effectively spent subsidies) 
which is symmetrical  to the huge DC tariff water in NAMA. 
 
Rows D and E of Columns 3 and 4 “translate” the cuts proposed by the EC, US, G20 and the 
Chair in terms equivalent to post-Doha tariffs.  For instance, the Chair proposal cuts the post-
Doha bound “subsidy rates” (quite equivalent to tariff rates) to 11-18 percent. 
 
This information should be connected with the post-Doha tariffs on imports calculated in 
Table 6.  In the EC case for instance, farm products would have an average post-Doha tariff of 
6-8 percent and a subsidy rate (generated by domestic support paid to farmers only) of 11-18 
percent.  Average post-Doha tariff on food products would be roughly 16 percent (with little 
domestic support). 
 
In sum, the level of protection in agriculture would come quite close from the post-Doha 
bound tariff rates in NAMA for the DCs.  Translating these calculations into Swiss 
coefficients is not difficult.  It shows that the Swiss coefficients for OTDS would range from 
15 to 30, that is, within the range of the Swiss coefficients proposed for the DCs in NAMA. 
 
These comparisons are based on averages.  As in the tariff case, it would be important to look 
at the highest domestic support rates – be in specific products or not.  The absence of publicly 
available and detailed enough information on “peak subsidy rates” makes this task impossible 
in this note.  Suffice to say, then, that, in accordance with the approach taken in NAMA and 
agriculture tariffs, cut rates should be higher for the highest domestic support rates – as 
indeed, it would be the case for cotton. 
 
                                                 
16  Tariff rates are tariff values as a percentage of the imported values.  Expressing the subsidies as a percentage 
of the production (value added) net of subsidies would not change substantially the conclusions drawn from 
columns 3 and 4. 
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